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I. Introduction 
 The rule of law is one of the founding principles of the United States of America and has 
shaped U.S. legal thinking and practice in many areas. The basic idea is simple: the people and 
their actions are not governed and regulated by arbitrary decisionmakers, but by a set of rules 
that serves as a check against potential abuses of power.  
 Due process and fairness in enforcement procedures represent a critical aspect of the rule 
of law. Allowing greater participation by the parties and making enforcement procedures more 
transparent serve several functions, including better decisionmaking, greater respect for 
government, stronger economic growth, promotion of investment, limits on corruption and 
politically motivated actions, regulation of bureaucratic ambition, and greater control of agency 
staff whose incentives may not align with agency leadership or who may be using an 
enforcement matter to advance their careers. That is why international legal organizations such 
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as the International Competition Network (ICN),1 the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD),2 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),3 the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),4 and the American Bar Association (ABA)5 have all 
offered frameworks that promote greater fairness and transparency in antitrust enforcement.  
 Due process and fairness are particularly important in antitrust enforcement. Because the 
U.S. was the first country to enact an antitrust law, it has enjoyed the greatest opportunity to 
develop its enforcement practices. As such, after first introducing the key antitrust enforcement 
institutions, this chapter will explore the manner in which the U.S. implements four key 
procedural protections to provide insights into ways to improve U.S. law. 
II. The U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Agencies 
 In the U.S., the federal antitrust laws (primarily the Sherman Antitrust Act,6 the Federal 
Trade Commission Act,7 and the Clayton Antitrust Act8) are enforced by the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Both agencies 
share jurisdiction over civil enforcement, including merger review, which is allocated by 
 
1 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (2014), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1028.pdf. 
2 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. COMPETITION COMMITTEE, POLICY ROUNDTABLE ON PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS: TRANSPARENCY ISSUES IN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/48825133.pdf. 
3 ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, ASEAN REGIONAL GUIDELINES ON COMPETITION POLICY (2010), 
https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Compendium/Documents/ASEAN/ASEAN-
RegionalGudelinesonCompetitionPolicy.pdf. 
4 ICC COMM’N ON COMPETITION, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2010), 
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/ICC-International-Due-process-08-03-10.pdf. 
5 AM. BAR ASS’N, BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST PROCEDURE: THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OFFERS ITS 
MODEL (2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/antitrust/dec15_lipsky_tritell_12_11f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012). 
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. 
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29, 52-53. 
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industry between the two agencies. The DOJ, however, has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal 
enforcement. 
 The DOJ is the federal executive department primarily responsible for the enforcement of 
the law and administration of justice in the U.S. The Antitrust Division is one of the DOJ’s six 
primary litigating divisions. It is headed by an Assistant Attorney General and supported by six 
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, four Directors of Enforcement (collectively called the Front 
Office), and an Office of Operations. Most of the civil investigations and litigation proceedings 
are carried out by six Washington, D.C.-based, industry-specific, litigation sections, while 
criminal investigations are conducted either by field offices in Chicago, New York, and San 
Francisco, or one of the two D.C.-based criminal sections. The sections are each supported by an 
Economic Analysis Group (EAG) staffed with expert economists. In both criminal and civil 
matters, the DOJ can only proceed as a litigant in court.9 
 The FTC is an independent agency headed by five Commissioners, nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, each serving seven-year terms, and supported by three 
primary bureaus. The Bureau of Competition is primarily responsible for the agency’s 
enforcement of antitrust law. The Bureau of Competition is led by a Director and divided into six 
D.C.-based sections and three regional offices. The FTC can pursue actions either in court or 
through administrative adjudication, although administrative enforcement is rare. 
 Both the FTC and the DOJ have access to extensive tools when investigating potential 
antitrust violations. Initial investigations rely primarily on voluntary procedures, such as requests 
for access letters, questionnaires, formal surveys, and interviews.10 Additionally, the FTC and 
 
9 15 U.S.C. § 4. 
10 FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING MANUAL §§ 3.2.3.2, 3.3.6.7.5.1, at 10, 26 (Release 89-1, 1989), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/foia-resources/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals [hereinafter FTC OPERATING 
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DOJ use civil investigative demands (CIDs) when appropriate during initial investigations to 
preserve confidentiality or to gather information critical to a quick and efficient resolution of the 
investigation.11 In later stages of investigations, both agencies may resort to compulsory 
procedures. In civil cases, the tool of choice for the DOJ is the CID, which can be used to compel 
the production of documents, answers to written interrogatories, and testimony.12 The FTC may 
also employ CIDs, but prefers the use of subpoenas for competition cases, as well as other 
compulsory techniques, including hearings, access orders, and orders to file special reports.13 
The parties under investigation have a duty to cooperate with the investigation and are prohibited 
from supplying false or misleading information.14 In criminal cases, compulsory process takes 
the form of grand jury subpoenas.15 Searches of the premises of suspected companies or 
individuals may substitute for subpoenas duces tecum in order to reduce the risk of the company 
destroying or concealing documents relevant to the investigation.16 
III. Restricting Abuse – Four Essential Procedural Protections Under U.S. Law 
 While the investigatory powers of the agencies are substantial, due process plays an 
important part in any investigation or litigation. In all cases, the U.S. Constitution guarantees it.17 
In court proceedings brought by agencies, the rules of procedure apply. In administrative 
enforcement, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and agency rules govern. Although the 
 
MANUAL]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL III-27 (5th ed., 2017), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-manual [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL]. 
11 Id. at III-38. 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (2012); ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-45, III-47. 
13 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.7, at 24, § 3.3.6.7.5.3, at 27. 
14 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2); ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-81. 
15 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-46. 
16 Id. at III-90. 
17 The Fifth Amendment commands that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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general principles of due process are applied consistently, the details can differ according to the 
nature of the procedure in question.  
 Procedures at the FTC and the DOJ differ, and thus will be described separately. Both the 
FTC and DOJ have published detailed guidance documents that describe their internal practices. 
The relevant FTC administrative staff manual is its Operating Manual.18 The DOJ describes its 
practices in its Antitrust Division Manual.19 These documents do not bind the agency or create 
any enforceable rights, benefits, or defenses—substantive or procedural—although the 
procedural rights that they contain are enforceable to the extent that they describe the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of the agency.  
A. Legal Representation 
 The right to legal representation for the parties under investigation is an essential part of 
due process and procedural rights. Both the FTC’s and DOJ’s law and practice recognize a 
general right of the parties to be represented by counsel. However, both enforcement agencies 
limit the right to counsel in certain investigations.  
1. FTC 
 The FTC’s Operating Manual states that staff will ordinarily contact parties during the 
course of the investigation to advise them of the general nature of the inquiry, including the 
statutes and the alleged violations involved, and to request information. If the proposed 
 
18 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10. The FTC website notes that the Operating Manual “is currently under 
review” and that “[m]any parts of the Operating Manual are outdated and no longer accurately reflect Commission 
practice.” Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Administrative Staff Manuals, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/foia-
resources/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
19 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10. 
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respondent is represented by counsel, any requests for information, documents, access, or 
interviews should be made through counsel.20 
 Any witnesses compelled to appear in person during the pre-complaint phases of an 
investigation have the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel.21 The 
regulations prohibit counsel from conferring with witnesses when a question is pending or 
instructing them not to answer a question unless necessary to preserve protected status.22 Counsel 
also has the right to be present at investigational hearings.23 Witnesses may be represented by 
counsel distinct from the counsel for the respondent under investigation. Thus, the Operating 
Manual advises FTC staff to contact counsel for the respondent corporation prior to contacting 
employees.24 In addition, certain state ethical rules give counsel for the corporation the right to 
be present during an interview with one of its employees.25 
 Once the FTC initiates a formal administrative proceeding or a civil action in court, the 
right to counsel is guaranteed by statute.26 Representation by counsel is presumed in all stages of 
the proceedings, including the prehearing procedures,27 filing of motions,28 requests for witness 
testimony,29 and appeals of the initial decision of the hearing officer to the FTC.30 In 
 
20 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.3, at 19. 
21 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 2.9(b) (2018). 
22 16 C.F.R. § 2.9(b)(1)-(2). 
23 16 C.F.R. § 2.7(f)(3). 
24 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.3, at 19. 
25 E.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 2-100 (2017), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ethics/2d_RRC/California-Rules-Professional-Conduct.pdf; see also 
28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (requiring that government attorneys comply with the rules of state in which they are engaging 
in their duties). 
26 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). 
27 16 C.F.R. § 3.21(a) (2018). 
28 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(c). 
29 16 C.F.R. § 3.39(b). 
30 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(g). 
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administrative adjudications, anyone admitted to the bar of a U.S. state or a Member State of the 
European Union may serve as counsel.31 
 If the FTC decides to pursue its claim in civil court through an injunction, the right to be 
represented by counsel is guaranteed by statute, just as in any judicial proceeding.32 In judicial 
enforcement actions, counsel must be admitted to practice in the relevant jurisdiction. State rules 
usually restrict practice in front of U.S. District Courts to attorneys who are members of the bar 
of a U.S. state. 
2. DOJ 
 The rights of the parties in DOJ proceedings are similar, but not identical, to those that 
apply in the FTC proceedings. During the preliminary investigation stage, staff relies primarily 
upon voluntary requests for information.33 If compulsory process is necessary, a CID deponent 
may be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel in confidence at the deposition.34 In 
the case of CIDs for documentary material, staff invites counsel for the respondent to discuss 
ways to resolve any avoidable problems, provide an oral summary of relevant personnel and 
company records, and to discuss a reasonable response time.35 
 In criminal investigations, grand jury proceedings are confidential, and the person 
suspected of having committed the crime is not entitled to be present or to have an attorney 
present.36 With respect to search warrants, enforcement officials need not wait until counsel is 
 
31 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(a). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012). 
33 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-27. 
34 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(A). 
35 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-51. 
36 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). 
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present before executing the search,37 although any counsel present are typically permitted to 
observe and often coordinate responses, as long as they do not interfere with the search.38 
 After the investigation, the DOJ can enforce the antitrust laws in civil or criminal actions 
in a U.S. District Court. Both the U.S. Constitution and the applicable statutes recognize 
defendants’ right to counsel during these judicial proceedings.39 Representation in U.S. District 
Court is limited to counsel admitted to the bar of some U.S. jurisdiction.40 Counsel may 
participate in settlement negotiations and may review consent decrees, but are not permitted to 
review Competitive Impact Statements (CIS).41 
B. Notice of Legal Basis and Evidence Underlying the Alleged Violation 
 Preparation of a meaningful defense against any allegation requires that agency inform 
the respondent of the legal and factual bases of the investigation and disclose the evidence on 
which it is relying. Such notice is a necessary prerequisite for the respondent to be able to 
prepare its arguments and gather evidence to rebut the agency’s assertions.  
1. FTC 
 FTC staff will ordinarily contact proposed respondents during the course of an 
investigation to advise them of the general nature of the inquiry, including the statutes and the 
 
37 United States v. Cates, 663 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the right to counsel does not attach upon 
issuance of a search warrant); People v. Ferringer, 507 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1988) (same). 
38 TEFFT W. SMITH & JOHN F. HARTMANN, A HOW-TO GUIDE FOR AN EFFECTIVE FBI SEARCH WARRANT RESPONSE 
PROGRAM 5, 6, 7, 8 (1998), available at 
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2509/Document1/MA-9-search_dfa.pdf. 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012). 
40 U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF MD., SURVEY OF ADMISSIONS RULES IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2015), 
http://www.msba.org/uploadedFiles/MSBA/Member_Groups/Sections/Litigation/USDCTMDSurvey0115.pdf. 
41 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at IV-51. 
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alleged violations involved.42 If no contact was made during the investigation and if a 
recommendation for complaint is contemplated, staff should contact the proposed respondents at 
the conclusion of the investigation and inform them that a recommendation for complaint is 
being forwarded to the FTC Commissioners unless notification must be avoided to ensure 
preservation of evidence or other circumstances militate against contact.43  
 As noted earlier, staff rely primarily on voluntary requests for information during the 
initial stages of any investigation.44 If compulsory process is necessary, staff must submit a 
memorandum to the Commission describing with specificity the legal theory of the investigation, 
the facts known, the information needed, the reasons why the information is relevant to the 
inquiry, and the cost and burden that production would impose on target companies.45 The FTC’s 
rules require that every party subject to compulsory process “be advised of the purpose and 
scope of the investigation, the nature of the acts or practices under investigation, and the 
applicable provisions of law.”46 Respondents may submit a petition to quash any FTC 
compulsory measure if they believe the request is unduly burdensome or seeks irrelevant 
information, in which case the agency must defend the basis for its actions.47  
 If the FTC decides to pursue formal charges in court, notice of the legal and factual basis 
of the charges and evidence are governed by the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, the Rules require that the complaint provide a 
short and plain statement of the claim48 and that the factual contentions have evidentiary 
 
42 16 C.F.R. § 2.6 (2018); FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.1, at 19. 
43 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.1, at 19, § 4.14.2, at 9. 
44 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
45 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.6.7.5.1, at 26. 
46 16 C.F.R. § 2.6; accord FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.2.3.2, at 10, § 3.6.7.5.3(1), at 28. 
47 16 C.F.R. § 2.10. 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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support.49 The Rules also provide for extensive discovery, including compulsory disclosure of 
“of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party 
has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses,” the 
identity of any expert witnesses along with their written reports, the names and addresses of any 
witnesses expected to be called, and each document or exhibit expected to be introduced into 
evidence.50 Any proposed settlements must be accompanied by a complaint, decision and order, 
and an analysis of the proposed consent order to aid public comment.51 
 When the FTC initiates an administrative adjudication, the complaint must include a 
“recital of the legal authority and jurisdiction for institution of the proceeding, with specific 
designation of the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated” and a “clear and concise 
factual statement sufficient to inform each respondent with reasonable definiteness of the type of 
acts or practices alleged to be in violation of the law.”52 After the respondent has filed its answer, 
regulations require that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearing the matter convene a 
scheduling conference, where counsel for the parties must be prepared to address their factual 
and legal theories.53 Before the commencement of the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ must 
convene a final prehearing conference, where both parties must “submit any proposed 
stipulations as to law, fact, or admissibility of evidence, exchange exhibit and witness lists, and 
designate testimony to be presented by deposition.”54 Any settlements of administrative 
 
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), (2), (3) 
51 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2018). 
52 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(b)(1) and (2). 
53 16 C.F.R. § 3.21(b)(1). 
54 16 C.F.R. § 3.21(e). 
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enforcement actions must be subject to the same disclosure and public comment process 
described above.55 
2. DOJ 
 In civil cases, the DOJ is subject to disclosure obligations that are similar to those 
imposed on the FTC. The DOJ faces even stricter requirements in criminal cases. Staff attorneys 
wishing to proceed with formal investigations must draft preliminary investigation memoranda, 
which must include a description of the allegedly illegal practices, the evidence supporting the 
potential antitrust violation, and any contrary evidence.56 Staff should also draft an investigation 
plan laying out candidate theories of competitive harm, any evidence that would support each 
theory, and the sources from which such evidence could be obtained.57 These documents, 
however, are only for internal use. Staff typically communicate with the proposed respondents as 
the investigation nears its conclusion to inform them of the theories of competitive harm, the 
nature of the evidence that support them, the agency’s economic analysis, and the possible scope 
of relief.58 
 In civil cases, court actions are subject to the same disclosure requirements as the FTC, 
discussed above.59 For civil settlements, the government must file a CIS describing the nature 
and purpose of the proceeding, the practices giving rise to the alleged violation, the proposed 
final judgment, the remedies available to potential private litigants, the procedures available for 
modification of the judgment, and the alternatives considered by the agency.60 The proposed 
 
55 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
56 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-8. 
57 Id. at III-13. 
58 Id. at III-111. 
59 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
60 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012); ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at IV-51 to IV-54. 
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judgment and CIS are published in the Federal Register, and summaries are published in local 
newspapers.61 
 In criminal cases, the indictment issued by the grand jury provides notice of the charges 
and the evidence on which the case is based. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions obligate the government to disclose any evidence favorable to an 
accused that is material to guilt or punishment62 as well as any evidence tending to impeach any 
potential witnesses.63 Moreover, the defendant has the right to inspect the government’s case 
file.64 In addition, the Antitrust Division Manual (by reference to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) 
requires disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment information that broader and more 
comprehensive disclosure than that required by the Supreme Court.65  
C. Engagement Between the Parties and the Investigative Staff 
 Simple notification of the allegations and representation by counsel are not sufficient to 
guarantee meaningful due process. Rather, the system must provide the parties an opportunity to 
engage with the agency’s investigative staff and decisionmakers. Through that contact, they can 
react to developments in the agency’s investigation and arguments. Because antitrust cases are 
often particularly complex, the interaction also allows the agency to better understand the 
industry practices and the market and evaluate the initial allegations in that light.  
 
61 15 U.S.C. § 16(c); ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at IV-54 to IV-55. 
62 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1974 Amendment; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
433 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
63 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
64 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1). 
65 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at IV-72 to IV-73 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-5.001 (updated June 2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-
issues-related-trials-and-other-court-proceedings#9-5.001; Christine A. Varney, Memorandum for Antitrust 
Criminal Division Attorneys on Antitrust Division Criminal Discovery Policy (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/04/24/313434.pdf.. 
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1. FTC 
 The FTC “values open communication with the subjects of [their] investigations.”66 Staff 
ordinarily contact proposed respondents during the course of an investigation to advise them of 
the general nature of the inquiry, including the alleged violations and relevant statutes 
involved.67 If no contact was made during the investigation and if a recommendation for 
complaint is contemplated, staff should contact the proposed respondents at the conclusion of the 
investigation, informing them that they will have an opportunity to submit their views in writing 
to the FTC and may also request meetings with Commissioners.68 This opportunity for the 
submission and consideration of facts and arguments is statutorily guaranteed,69 but also 
encouraged by the agency.70 Subjects of an investigation and their counsel have several 
opportunities to discuss their positions with staff lawyers, economists, and senior management 
through frequent status calls, regular in-person meetings, and the opportunity to submit “white 
papers” on key issues.71 
 When the FTC uses compulsory measures in its investigation, it “expects all parties to 
engage in meaningful discussions with staff to prevent confusion or misunderstandings regarding 
the nature and scope of the information and material being sought, in light of the inherent value 
 
66 Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement and the 
FTC Experience, Remarks at King’s College, Centre of European Law 7 (Oct. 23, 2015), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/836913/mcsweeny_-_kings_college_remarks_10-23-
15.pdf. 
67 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.1, at 19. 
68 Id.  
69 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (2012). 
70 McSweeny, supra note 66, at 7. 
71 Paul O’Brien, Krisztian Katona & Randolph Tritell, Procedural Fairness in Competition Investigations, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2015, at 3, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/7401. 
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of genuinely cooperative discovery.”72 For that purpose, there are mandatory meetings with 
Commission staff to discuss compliance and to address and attempt to resolve all issues.73 
 When the FTC proceeds in court, engagement with the parties is governed by federal 
statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for multiple opportunities for 
engagement in status hearings, discovery proceedings, pretrial conferences, settlement 
negotiations, and trial. In administrative adjudications, staff should inform respondents when the 
complaint is forwarded.74 The Administrative Procedure Act requires the FTC to grant every 
person with an interest the proceeding the opportunity to submit facts, arguments, and offers for 
settlement or adjustment.75 The proposed respondent is given the opportunity to submit its views 
in writing to the Commission and may request meetings with Commissioners.76 The FTC must 
give every settling individual and corporation the opportunity to submit a proposed consent 
decree.77 In practice, consent decrees are negotiated between parties and staff and are then 
subject to public comment.78 
2. DOJ 
 At the DOJ, staff typically relies upon voluntary requests for information from the 
potential subjects of the investigation, other companies within the industry, customers, trade 
associations, and other sources during the preliminary stages of an investigation.79 When the 
DOJ proceeds by issuing a CID, it attaches a cover letter inviting the respondent or its counsel to 
 
72 16 C.F.R. § 2.4 (2018). 
73 16 C.F.R. § 2.7(k). 
74 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.3.6.1, at 19. 
75 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (2012). 
76 Id. § 3.3.6.1, at 19. 
77 16 C.F.R. § 2.31(a). 
78 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra notes 10, 33 and accompanying text 
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telephone the antitrust investigator to attempt to resolve any avoidable problems created by the 
CID and to discuss a reasonable response time.80 Respondents may also petition a court to quash 
a CID, which allows courts to review whether the request is unduly burdensome and whether the 
information sought is relevant.81 Courts reviewing the adequacy of the CID disclosure have taken 
into account correspondence and conversations between the Government and the recipient prior 
to issuance of the CID.82 
 As the staff nears the conclusion of its investigation, it should afford respondents the 
opportunity to meet with staff to present their views of the case.83 Parties who may be sued or 
recommended for indictment are usually also afforded an opportunity to meet with a senior 
Antitrust Division official prior to a decision whether or not to file suit or seek an indictment.84 
In criminal cases, the DOJ’s manual provides that the staff and chief of the field office afford 
counsel for the potential defendant the chance to meet.85 In merger investigations, it is common 
for potential respondents to request a meeting with the Director of Enforcement and the 
appropriate Deputy Assistant Attorney General.86 
 Should a civil matter proceed to trial, defendants are entitled to the full protections of the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As noted earlier, the DOJ 
must publish the documents associated with any proposed settlements and the CIS in the Federal 
Register, publish summaries of those documents in local newspapers, and accept public comment 
 
80 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-52. 
81 Id. at III-77. 
82 Material Handling Inst. v. McLaren, 426 F.2d 90, 92 (3d. Cir. 1970). 
83 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-111. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. III-119. 
86 Id. at III-116. 
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on the proposed settlement.87 It must also file a response to those comments with the district 
court and publish its response in the Federal Register.88 
 The process of engagement is different in criminal cases. When the DOJ decides to 
initiate a grand jury proceeding or execute a search warrant in a criminal case, often no prior 
engagement with the parties is sought in order to avoid the risk of destruction of evidence.89 
Once a grand jury has been convened, engagement by the defendants is defined by the U.S. 
Constitution, federal statutes, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. For example, it is 
common for respondents who believe that a subpoena is unduly burdensome to negotiate with 
the government to narrow its scope.90 In addition, most criminal cases settle with a plea 
bargain,91 which necessarily requires substantial engagement with the parties. Some defendants 
may concede its role in the antitrust violation in order to take advantage of the leniency 
program.92 Defendants are generally afforded a meeting with the Front Office to discuss leniency 
requests.93 
D. Internal Checks and Balances and Judicial Review 
 Internal and external checks and balances are a key component of any legal system that 
strives to provide due process in antitrust proceedings. Even superb procedural protections are 
unlikely to be meaningful if they cannot be controlled through internal and judicial oversight. 
Internal checks and balances on decisionmaking within the agency are the first step in such a 
 
87 See supra note 60-61 and accompanying text. 
88 15 U.S.C. § 16(d) (2012); ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at IV-54. 
89 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-90. 
90 Id. at III-86 to III-87. 
91 SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, DEFERRED PROSECUTION, AND PLEA 
AGREEMENTS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ALLEGED CORPORATE CRIMINAL WRONGDOING 29-31 (2015), 
http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/Full%20Report%20-%20SCJI%20NPA-
DPA%2C%20April%202015%281%29.pdf. 
92 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-95. 
93 Id. at III-101. 
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review system, but control by an independent judge that is free from any bias must follow this 
internal review. 
1. FTC 
 The FTC Operating Manual provides guidance on general FTC practice and foresees 
numerous internal checks and balances. For example, when staff seeks to initiate an investigation 
in non-merger civil cases, it must seek approval by the Assistant Bureau Director, who then 
prepares his recommendation and forwards the request to the Evaluation Office for review by the 
Evaluation Committee.94 The Evaluation Committee then reviews the proposal and sends its 
advisory recommendation to the Bureau Director, who makes the final determination on the 
initiation of each matter.95 All enforcement recommendations are also reviewed by the Bureau of 
Economics96 and cleared with the Department of Justice.97  
 When an investigation requires expansion from the initial phase to a full investigation, 
renewed review by the Evaluation Committee and approval by the Bureau Director is required.98 
If the full investigation requires the adoption of investigative resolutions to issue CIDs or 
subpoenas, additional approval by the moving Commissioner for the matter is required, and each 
subpoena or CID must be signed by a Commissioner.99 
 If staff prepares a memorandum recommending an administrative complaint, this 
memorandum is sent to the Commission via the appropriate Assistant Director and the Bureau 
 
94 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 3.2.2.1.3, at 17. For a general description of the review process, see 
id. § 2.5.2.7, at 7. For a description of the Evaluation Committee, see id. § 2.5.2.3, at 5-6. 
95 Id. § 2.5.2.7, at 8, § 3.2.2.1.3, at 17 
96 Id. § 2.5.2.8, at 8. 
97 Id. § 3.2.2.1.3, at 9. 
98 Id. § 3.3.5.1.3, at 17. 
99 Id. § 3.3.6.7.1, at 24, § 3.3.6.7.3, at 24. 
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Director.100 In addition, the recommendation for complaint will be sent to the Bureau of 
Economics for its concurrence or comment.101 Moreover, in its administrative enforcement 
actions, the FTC strictly separates the adjudicatory decisionmaker from the staff investigating the 
violation. The initial decision is made by a duly qualified Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), by 
the Commission, or by one or more members of the Commission sitting as an ALJ.102 ALJs are 
selected through a competitive examination.103 They are also are not subject to supervision or 
evaluation by anyone in the agency.104 Their compensation and advancement is decided by the 
Office of Personnel Management, an agency outside the FTC,105 and they can be removed or 
disciplined only by the Merit Systems Protection Board for good cause.106 Communication 
between the ALJ and investigative or prosecuting staff and outside third parties are forbidden 
unless it is made on the public record.107 These protections are intended to ensure ALJs are as 
impartial as possible. 
 The ALJ’s decision shall show on the record “each finding, conclusion, or exception 
presented” and shall include a statement of “findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis 
therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.”108 
Respondents may appeal ALJ decisions to the full Commission.109 When this occurs, the 
Commissioners accepts briefs from both the FTC staff and the accused company.110 In the past, 
 
100 Id. § 4.14.2, at 9. 
101 Id. § 4.14.3, at 9. 
102 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.42(a), 3.51(a) (2018). 
103 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(b). 
104 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.206. 
105 5 C.F.R. § 930.205. 
106 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211(a). 
107 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d); 16 C.F.R. § 4.7(b). 
108 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(A)-(B). 
109 5 U.S.C. § 557(b); 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b)(1) (2018). 
110 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(c)-(d); FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 10, § 10.25.3, at 34. 
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some Commissioners who served as the ALJ on a particular investigation have recused 
themselves from voting on the appeal.111  
 This fairly strong separation of authority between investigatory and prosecutorial staff 
from adjudicatory staff guarantees an internal check through institutional design by honoring the 
principle that no one should be a judge in his or her own cause. The fact that ALJs are rendered 
independent of the agency to the greatest extent possible is designed to insulate them from 
identifying with the agency’s success. 
 In addition, any settlements are subject to external review by the public. Specifically, 
proposed administrative settlements must be shared with the public, along with an analysis of the 
proposed consent order to aid public comment prepared by FTC staff.112 The FTC must accept 
comments from the public and may modify its decision based on those comments.113 
 After this internal decisionmaking process, administrative adjudications are appealable to 
the courts under the APA.114 Courts review agency factual findings to ensure they are supported 
by “substantial evidence.”115 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this provision are requiring 
more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the agency’s conclusion.116 In addition, courts must 
base their evaluation of the substantiality of the evidence “on the record considered as a 
whole.”117 Courts also set aside agency actions that failed to follow legally required 
 
111 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, So I Serve as Both a Prosecutor and a Judge, Remarks Before 
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 15 (Aug. 5, 2010), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/so-i-serve-both-prosecutor-and-judge-whats-
big-deal/100805abaspeech.pdf. 
112 See supra notes 51, 78 and accompanying text. 
113 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(d)-(e). 
114 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
115 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 
116 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
117 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). 
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procedures.118 For example, a Commissioner must issue a CID pursuant to a Commission 
resolution, and a staff attorney seeking to initiate an investigation through these measures must 
therefore seek at least formal approval.119 A violation of such statutory rules would result in an 
overturning of the decision. 
 In addition to reviewing an agency’s factual findings and procedural compliance, the 
APA requires that courts review agencies’ decisionmaking processes to ensure that they are not 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”120 The 
courts have implemented this statutory mandate by ensuring that the agency has taken a “hard 
look” at the issue121 and that the decisionmaking process has permitted all of the issues to be 
“thoroughly ventilated.”122 Under hard look review, agencies may base their decisions on 
economic models so long as those models are supported by “empirical confirmation of accuracy” 
or the agency offers “a complete analytical defense of [the] model to respond to each objection 
with a reasoned presentation.”123 The fact that courts apply a deferential standard of review to an 
agency’s use of an economic model does not relieve the agency from the obligation to “explain[] 
the assumptions and methodology used in preparing the model”124 and show “a rational 
connection between the factual inputs, modeling assumptions, modeling results and conclusions 
drawn from these results” as well as “evidence that the agency is conscious of the limits of the 
model.”125 Courts will reject any economic model that bears “no rational relationship to the 
 
118 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 
119 15 U.S.C. § 49(1), 16 C.F.R. § 2.7(a) (2018). 
120 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
121 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citing WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 
F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).  
122 Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
123 See Am. Pub. Gas Ass’n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
124 See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
125 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 333, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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reality it purports to represent”126 or “generate[s] apparently arbitrary results particularly where 
. . . the agency has failed to justify its choice.”127 
2. DOJ 
 The DOJ’s Antitrust Division Manual outlines a similar series of internal checks and 
balances on agency decisionmaking. For example, staff attorneys who believe they have 
developed a sufficient factual and legal basis to initiate a preliminary investigation must consult 
with an economist in the EAG and seek approval by the relevant section chief or field office 
chief.128 The memo recommending the preliminary investigation is cleared with the FTC and 
circulated to all chiefs and assistant chiefs.129  
 When a staff member is deciding whether to issue CIDs, issue a second request for 
information during a merger clearance, or open a grand jury investigation, the Antitrust Division 
Manual advises them to consult with the section or field office chief and the relevant EAG chief 
to discuss the results of the investigation.130 Requests for CIDs and second requests must be 
approved by the relevant section chief131 and obtain clearance from the FTC.132 All 
recommendations for compulsory process must also be processed through the relevant Director 
of Enforcement and the relevant Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and require the approval of 
the Assistant Attorney General.133  
 
126 See Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
127 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
128 ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 10, at III-8, III-36. 
129 Id. at III-10, III-36. 
130 Id. at III-154. 
131 Id. at III-58. 
132 Id. at III-42. 
133 Id. at III-20; see also id. at III-38 (providing specific guidance on second requests); id. at III-58 to III-59 
(providing specific guidance on CIDs); id. at III-82 (providing specific guidance on opening grand jury 
investigations). 
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 Staff that would like to bring an enforcement action in court must confront additional 
internal checks. For civil actions, staff must notify the assigned Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, other Deputy Assistant Attorneys General in charge of litigation, the Director of 
Enforcement in charge of Litigation, and the Office of Operations.134 For criminal actions, staff 
must obtain approval of the appropriate section or field office chief, and the Deputy Assistant 
Attorneys General for Operations and for the Criminal Division, with the final decision resting 
with the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division.135 As noted earlier, the 
DOJ must also submit any proposed settlements to the court along with a CIS and publish those 
documents in the Federal Register and summaries of those documents in local newspapers.136 
The DOJ must also file responses to those comments with the district court and publish that 
response in the Federal Register.137 
 With respect to judicial oversight, unlike the FTC, the DOJ cannot enforce the antitrust 
laws administratively and must instead bring all of its cases in U.S. District Court. The 
adjudicatory decisionmaker is therefore a judge who is completely independent of the agency. 
The facts that the DOJ bears the burden of proof and is subject to the same procedural rules 
applicable to all judicial proceedings permits courts to oversee much of the DOJ’s actions 
without according any deference to agency decisions. Courts also review proposed settlements to 
ensure that they are in the public interest.138 All final judgments issued by District Courts may be 
appealed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.139 
 
134 Id. at III-43, III-44, III-114, III-116. 
135 Id. at III-123 to III-125. 
136 See supra notes 60-61, 87 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
138 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f) (2012). 
139 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 A properly functioning system of antitrust enforcement depends on more than just well-
designed substantive principles. It also requires enforcement procedures that enhance accuracy, 
ensure fairness, promote confidence in the overall system, and prevents abuses of power. U.S. 
law attempts to accomplish these goals by giving parties notice of the legal and factual basis of 
the claims, encouraging engagement with enforcement staff, and providing for an extensive set 
of internal checks and balances and external review by the public and the courts, all supported by 
broad legal representation. 
 At the same time, the situation in the U.S. shows that procedural rules must have some 
flexibility to accommodate the institutional differences between the FTC and DOJ. Although the 
FTC and DOJ follow the same baseline of procedural protections, they sometimes implement 
them in slightly different ways. The comparison suggests enforcement authorities may enjoy 
some degree of latitude in fashioning enforcement procedures that adhere to the principles of due 
process. 
